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The aim of this article is to identify the modalities of financing international trade security. 
Our analysis is more specifically oriented by the issue of financing the developing countries 
which must make a considerable effort to attain the required level, whereas the developed 
countries have already largely invested in trade security since the events of 11
th September 
2001. We first characterise security in the context of a global public good, before studying the 
financing conditions and the discriminating criteria of the supply of the global public good 
security. We then presents a critical analysis of the various possible sources and instruments 
for financing the global public good security and propose different financing scenarios, each 
one  based  on  a  specific  allocation  of  responsibilities  among  the  players  in  security.  We 
conclude by considering the role of the international institutions as project managers of the 
financing and implementation of the security of international trade. 
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1.  Introduction 
The attacks of 11
th September 2001 without doubt marked a turning point in the way that 
countries approach the security of international trade. In the past mainly confined to economic 
and  financial  security  and  to  the  fight  against  fraud  and  counterfeiting,  the  security  of 
international trade today brings to the fore all the risks linked to the transport of illicit goods, 
arms, and materials of destruction. As well as the loss of human life and material destruction, 
a terrorist attack directed against international transport is likely to cause an interruption of 
services,  the  closure  of  ports  and  terminals  and  delays  in  the  shipment  of  freight  and 
passengers, with potentially serious effects for world trade (ICC, 2002). 
In this way, and in light of the increased number of cases of organised cross-border crime 
and the threat of terrorism, initiatives implementing new forms of controlling the circulation 
of  goods  have  been  multiplied.  The  American  C-TPAT
1  and  CSI
2  and  the  Swedish 
STAIRSEC programmes reflect this desire manifested by numerous states to add a security 
section to their customs protocols without, for all that, compromising the facilitation of trade 
and  fluidity  of  world  trade.  It  is  in  this  same  perspective  that  the  European  Union  is 
completing  the  community  customs  code  to  integrate  the  notion  of  international  trade 
security. The World Customs Organisation (OMD/WCO) has adopted a resolution by which it 
undertakes to be the vector of cooperation between the players in international trade for the 
“security and facilitation of the international supply chain (WCO, June 2002). 
The aim of this article is to identify the modalities of financing international trade security. 
Our analysis is more specifically oriented by the issue of financing the developing countries 
which must make a considerable effort to attain the required level, whereas the developed 
                                                            
1 Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. 
2 Container Security Initiative. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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countries have already largely invested in trade security since the events of 11
th September 
2001. 
The second section attempts to characterise security in the context of a global public good. 
The third section studies the financing conditions and the discriminating criteria of the supply 
of the global public good security. The fourth section presents a critical analysis of the various 
possible  sources  and  instruments  for  financing  the  global  public  good  security.  The  fifth 
section  studies  different  financing  scenarios,  each  one  based  on  a  specific  allocation  of 
responsibilities among the players in security and on the role of the international institutions 
as project managers of the financing and implementation of the security of international trade. 
2.  Security as a global public good 
The  security  tends  to  demonstrate  a  convergence  of  interests  between  the  firms  and  the 
governments.  It is a question of  guaranteeing the protection of the international transport 
system and its capacity to serve international trade. 
As such, security is a matter for the field of global public goods (Kaul, Grunberg, Stern, 
1999). Indeed, public goods create shared advantages and public “evils” create shared costs. 
The  spatial  scope  of  the  advantages  determines  whether  it  is  a  local  public  good  (in  the 
national sense), a regional or a global public good (Ferroni, 2001). Without a mechanism for 
collective action, the production of these goods would fail.  
a.  The characteristics of the global public good security 
The positive externalities are global and benefit everyone, even if security is a mixed global 
public good insofar as it provides a mixture of national and trans-national advantages, both 
public and private. For example, a secure port is likely to capture a larger share of the traffic 
of goods but only the security of all ports will reduce the risk of damages; except, of course, if 
we accept the removal of a certain number of ports from the major international sea routes CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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and  the  negative  consequences  in  terms  of  the  fluidity  of  trade  and,  therefore,  economic 
efficiency. 
The public good security is produced in an additive manner i.e. it demands that contributions 
be made in all countries and by all countries, and moreover by a large number of players in 
each  country.  However,  security  as  a  public  good  depends  on  the  weakest  link,  i.e.  the 
weakest national contribution to the supply of global public security. The more the countries 
themselves finance security, the greater their concern in ensuring that the results obtained are 
not reduced to nothing due to other countries failing to invest sufficiently in this public good, 
thus creating detrimental cross-border effects. Thus, in order to preserve the progress made, it 
is the duty of the countries with a high rate of provision in security to support international 
efforts to help other countries to increase their contribution to the global supply of these 
goods. It is nevertheless important to underline that the national contributions to the supply of 
security risk favouring the interests and advantages of the country and not the cross-border 
externalities. It is thus probable that only one or another form of international agreement, 
surveillance of the measures taken at national level and other forms of keeping those states in 
check which may be tempted to behave like a free rider, will be able to guarantee a sufficient 
supply of security. 
A simple cost-benefit analysis only poorly reveals the social return of security. On the other 
hand,  the  potential  cost  of  a  serious  event,  or  even  more  the  simultaneous  occurrence  of 
several serious events, is without doubt exorbitant. The context of decision-making is that of 
imperfect information. Besides the fact that the decision-makers and players are confronted 
with a lack of data for the benefits of actions for improving security, the costs of security are 
themselves difficult to evaluate due to the very high degree of heterogeneity of the players 
and situations. The “optimum” degree of security could not, then, be determined by economic 
calculation.  The  level  of  security  should  result  from  a  political  decision  and  economic CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
   
  6
analysis should concentrate on the choice of means which allow the objective of security to be 
achieved in the most efficient manner. 
The supply of the public good security requires both a basic activity (mechanisms aimed at 
developing  a  positive  externality)  and  a  complementary  activity  (measures  permitting  a 
country to absorb the advantages created by the development of the externality) (Kanbur, 
2001). This point is considered in detail below (cf. 3). 
The global public good security is the direct result of international policies; it thus depends on 
the efforts of various countries throughout the world and requires international coordination 
for its production. The production of the global public good security should be driven by the 
public  sector  in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  term.  This  does  not,  however,  means  that  its 
production should rely exclusively on public financing. 
By applying the concept of global public goods, we insist on the fact that the advantages of 
security are not limited to a single country, a single generation and a single population group. 
b.  The production of the global public good security: a problem of collective action 
Thus, all public goods, be they local, regional or global, tend to be produced in insufficient 
quantities. The reason for this is precisely because they are public goods. For individuals, the 
best and most rational strategy often consists in leaving the task of providing the good to 
others so as to benefit from it without cost; this is the problem of the “free rider” (Sandler, 
2001). On an international scale, this question of collective action is exacerbated by the gap 
between  externalities,  with  an  ever  more  international  scope,  and  the  fact  that  the  major 
decision-makers remain the states or groups of players. 
Production of the global public good security is also subject to the problem of the “prisoner’s 
dilemma”. Indeed, when economic agents do not trust one another (or do not have sufficient 
information about the strategy/action of the others), there is a great risk that decisions taken CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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individually are globally sub-optimum, i.e. they do not allow the objective of public good 
production to be achieved. Production of security consequently requires a form of intentional 
coordination of the players, a concerted collective action. 
This is where the issue of financing becomes important. The financing mechanism selected 
should allow these problems of collection action to be “corrected”. Financing is not only a 
question of collection of funds, it should also be an incentive for the production of security. 
3.  Financing and incentive: the production of international trade security 
Examining the financing modalities for the security of international trade requires that the 
informational context and the constraints, objectives and discriminating criteria conditioning 
such financing be specified. 
a.  The constraint and context of financing 
The  constraint  is  that  of  globality  which  means  that  global  financing  and  not  just  partial 
financing must rapidly become the objective. Let us recall that the supply of the global public 
good security demonstrates an additive character restricted by the weakest link.  
The  context  is that  of  imperfect  information,  and  more  particularly  that  of  moral  hazard. 
Moral hazard indicates a situation in which the uninformed agent, in this case the source of 
financing,  can  only  observe  the  action  of  an  agent  who  benefits  from  the  financing  (for 
example the players in a port zone) in an imperfect manner. The consequence is that the latter 
is tempted to behave in his own interests. Financing security is all the more subject to moral 
hazard as the country or the player benefiting from the financing doubts the utility of security 
in  satisfying  his  own  economic  interests,  and  as  the  control  of  the  use  of  funds  is  not 
particularly restrictive. The consequence is that the collection of funds is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for guaranteeing the supply of the global public good security. 
b.  The objectives of financing: efficiency and equity CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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As for any financing programme for global public goods, financing security should endeavour 
to combine a dual objective of efficiency and equity. The objective of efficiency involves 
considering the financing modalities from a triple standpoint. 
-  That of sufficient and durable collection of funds in view of the “desired” level of 
supply of the global public good security. 
-  That of the absence of distortions on competition; financing should be neutral in 
view of the competitive positions relating to the players and/or countries concerned. 
-  That  of  the  incentive  to  contribute  to  the  production  of  security.  The  idea  of 
incentives represents a key element of the security financing measures in a context of 
imperfect information. It means on the one hand that the implementation of financing 
measures for security should not discourage those players who would  already be 
committed to a process of creating security from pursuing their efforts. We could, for 
example,  assume  that  agents  who  have  produced  the  global  public  good  security 
independently would see their financial contribution diminish and/or could benefit 
from  a  greater  degree  of  trade  facilitation.  On  the  other  hand,  it  means  that  the 
financing mechanism should encourage players who have fallen behind to contribute 
to the production of security by encouraging them or by penalising them financially. 
The  idea  of  a  modulated  contribution  according  to  security  certification  and/or  a 
security “scoring” is not to be neglected in the incentive logic.  
The equity objective requires that the existing inequalities not be exacerbated and/or that the 
contributive capacity of the different players be taken into account both with regard to the 
modalities and the levels of contributions/financing. The equity in question here is an equity 
referred  to  as  vertical,  implying  that  the  agents/countries  with  the  highest  contributive 
capacity have the responsibility of financing a large part of the public good security. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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Most international negotiations concern global public goods which are of most interest to 
developed countries and neglect the interests of the other countries, hence the distrust shown 
by the latter towards global policies. Equity is thus an important dimension in promoting 
global public goods. A global public good programme should consider equitably the priorities 
of the different populations concerned. The modalities of financing should ideally allow the 
gap existing between developed countries and developing countries to be reduced with respect 
to the question of the efficiency of goods control systems.  
At this point, it is nevertheless important to specify that the objective of efficient financing 
may  be  inconsistent  with  that  of  equity.  The  clearly  weaker  contributive  capacities  of 
developing countries require, for example, the implementation of financing instruments such 
as subsidies which provide little incentive in the effective production of security. 
c.  The discriminating criteria of the supply of international security 
The gradual interpenetration of the public domains leads decision-makers for global public 
goods to implement various mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing the supply of public goods 
(UNDP,  2002).  By  taking  these  experiences  into  consideration,  we  shed  light  on  the 
discriminating criteria of the supply of security.  
The  first  criterion  quite  logically  refers  to  the  type  of  country  considered.  Indeed  if  the 
security of the international trade represents a major economic stake for most countries and 
players, the contributive capacities of the countries are not without incidence on the supply 
mechanisms to be favoured. The distinction between countries referred to as developed and 
developing  (and  amongst  the  latter  low-income  and  middle-income  countries)  cannot  be 
overlooked. It alone conditions the efficiency of the global supply process.  
The second criterion concerns the type of activity which provides security. As has already 
been mentioned, the supply of the public good security requires both a basic activity and CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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complementary  activities.  We  have  explained  that  the  supply  of  the  global  public  good 
security requires an action and activities which are coordinated on an international scale with 
shared responsibilities, structured between the international organisations, the states and the 
private partners. 
Three levels of action and responsibility define the architecture of the supply of the global 
public good security; these levels of action and responsibility logically have  incidences with 
regard to the method of financing. These three levels of action can be identified by means of 
three spheres (Sagasti, Bezanson, 2001). 
The global sphere. These are all the activities which do not concern a specific country and 
which  refer  to  knowledge,  i.e.  identifying  the  externalities  of  security  or  insecurity 
(identifying the risks of insecurity, measuring their impact for the international community on 
trade, growth, etc.), to fundamental and applied research concerning security and information 
technologies, to international dialogue and negotiation, i.e. common search for solutions to 
provide a sufficient level of the global public good security and which can be the object of an 
implicit or explicit agreement (international convention, protocol, treaty, etc.). 
The network sphere. Applying an agreement with a view to guaranteeing sufficient supply of 
the global public good security requires coordinated action of the international organisations, 
the states and the private partners, all the more so as the risk of free riders is high. Defining a 
partnership  framework,  operational  policies  (for  example  technical  assistance  in  defining 
needs) and procedures (for example harmonisation of customs procedures and information 
trade) in order to guarantee sufficient supply of the global public good security at local level, 
and the management of international financing mechanisms, are activities which refer to the 
network sphere, i.e. international institutional cooperation. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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The local sphere. This covers all activities relating to the national supply of the global public 
good security. It is national incentive policies, national financing mechanisms, but also, and in 
particular,  investments  relating  to  national  capacity  building:  acquisition  of  materials  for 
goods control, information technology, training personnel and organisational reforms. These 
activities can be defined within a legal framework which is more or less restrictive in relation 
to the network sphere. 
The  activities  of  the  global  and  network  spheres  are  referred  to  as  basic  as  they  initiate 
production of the global public good security. The activities of the local sphere are referred to 
as complementary as they allow each country, or each player, to benefit from the positive 
externalities of the public good security. 
Let  us,  however,  specify  that  the  question  of  financing  is  only  really  an  issue  for  the 
complementary activities
3 and that the latter involve spending on equipment, infrastructure (a 
port scanner, IT equipment, etc.) and operating costs (maintenance, labour training, etc.). 
4.  The main sources of financing: a critical analysis 
There are three main sources of financing: payment by the users, private sources and public 
sources. It is possible to combine them insofar as security not only benefits the community in 
its entirety but also directly benefits the agents who participate in the international trade. 
It  is  important  to  specify  that,  as  a  public  good,  security  should  not  be  financed  by  
withdrawal from resources destined for development aid (Guillaumont, 2002). Indeed, the 
latter essentially consists in allocating resources per country to provide for national needs, 
whereas financing global public goods involves allocations on a national and international 
scale to satisfy trans-national requirements. 
a.  Payment by users CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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Because the agents who participate in the international trade benefit directly from the public 
good  security,  the  “externalities”  can  be  partially  “internalised”,  i.e.  part  of  the  costs  of 
security can be borne by certain users and beneficiaries. This payment can be effected by 
applying a tax or fee to traded goods. 
The fee or tax can be ad valorem, i.e. it can apply to the value of the goods, or specific, i.e. it 
can apply to the volume (a container for example) or the weight of the goods. Financing by 
means of tax or fee has the major advantage of generating large regular sums in light of the 
volume of international trade flows, thus ensuring the durability of the supply of the public 
good security, but it does not guarantee a sufficient supply of public good to the weakest 
links. Indeed, as trade flows are asymmetric, the international trade is mainly concentrated in 
developed countries which therefore collect the majority of payments whereas they are not the 
weakest links. This modality of financing does not, therefore, allow the increase in the supply 
of the global public good security based on the weakest link. What is more, the capacity of 
developing countries to use contributions to finance the public good security is limited in light 
of the global budget constraint which weighs on their economies. In other respects, it provides 
little incentive as this type of financing applies uniformly whatever the efforts already made 
by the agents or countries to contribute to the supply of the public good security and whatever 
the risk of the transaction
4. Lastly, it is inequitable as the majority of resources will converge 
towards the rich countries which already have a high level of security, and because the rate of 
contributions is independent of the contributive capacity of the different agents and countries. 
To overcome these disadvantages, this type of financing should be differentiated according to 
the risk of “crime” in order to encourage the weakest links to implement a security process. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3  Indeed,  the  basic  activities  are  already  financed,  in  part,  through  state  contributions  to  the  international 
institutions, as well as by means of the budgets of the ministries concerned. 
4 When it is applied to the cif value of the goods, it incorporates freight and insurance in the calculation; it 
provides  greater  incentives  insofar  as  the  insurance  companies  incorporate  the  risk  when  calculating  the 
premiums.  However,  freight  and  insurance  only  represent  an  average  of  3.39  %  of  the  value  of  the  goods CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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The level of the tax or fee should thus be modulated according to  an agreement/security 
certification or to risk analysis. It could also be envisaged that the tax/fee only falls on those 
containers which are controlled physically and by scanner i.e. demonstrating a high risk. But 
more fundamentally, implementing a tax/fee is confronted by two major obstacles: The WTO 
agreements forbid the use of taxes which introduce distortions in international trade; The 
developing countries are not at the same level with regard to security certification and scoring, 
a fact which leads to their being systematically penalised whereas they do not all necessarily 
represent a high risk of crime. 
b.  Private sources 
Companies can contribute directly to financing the supply of the global public good security 
as  soon  as  they  respect  restrictive  security  norms  either  voluntarily  or  due  to  specific 
regulation or legislation (for example American C-TPAT and CSI programmes, the Swedish 
STAIRSEC, etc.). Their contribution is indirect when they finance independent foundations or 
company foundations
5. 
The main advantage of this type of financing is that it encourages production of the public 
good security if the certified companies benefit from increased trade facilitation. However it 
provides an insufficient level of global public good security. Indeed, insofar as not all the 
agents (or countries) could respect the norm, the supply of the global public good security 
would be limited by the supply of the least efficient agent (or country) among those which do 
not  respect  the  norm.  It  introduces  distortions  of  competition  between  the  operators  and 
between  the  countries.  This  could  be  inconsistent  with  certain  WTO  agreements.  It  is 
incompatible with the objective of equity. The level of the criteria demanded by certification 
would remove the operators from countries which are behind with regard to security. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(OECD, 2002) and the insurance premium is largely fixed on a commercial, not a technical, basis (risk analysis), 
which reduces the incentive aspect. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
   
  14
Companies  make  an  indirect  contribution  when  they  finance  independent  or  company 
foundations. These are voluntary contributions. The companies benefit from tax advantages 
established in the tax legislation of each state. The main advantage of this type of financing is 
that  it  conforms  to  the  objective  of  equity,  as  only  those  operators  or  countries  with  the 
capacity to contribute do so. However it provides an insufficient level of the public good 
security due to the voluntary, and therefore periodic and fluctuating, nature of the financing. It 
provides no incentives for companies which do not contribute. As a public good, the private 
supply of security is necessarily insufficient as the best strategy for individuals consists in 
leaving the task of financing to the others as it is impossible to prevent (without engaging 
prohibitive costs) the use of security by those individuals who do not contribute to the supply. 
Beyond  the  distinction  between  direct  and  indirect  contribution,  taking  private  financing 
sources  into  account  underlines  the  necessity  of  envisaging  efficient  public-private 
partnerships  which  would  require  the  creation  of  conditions  more  favourable  to  the 
participation of the private sector. Facilitation (direct financing) and tax incentives (indirect 
financing) represent some of these conditions which would not overlook the importance of 
intermediary financing between these two complementary logics (public-private). This last 
point is developed further (cf. 5). 
c.  Public sources 
Public  sources  are  numerous.  They  can  be  national,  regional  or  international;  unilateral, 
bilateral or multilateral. Public sources already finance numerous public goods in the fields of 
environment, health, peace-keeping or the resolution of conflicts
6. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 Traditionally, the foundations participate in financing in fields where the degree of risk destroys private or 
public initiatives (cf. research into rare diseases in the field of health). 
6 According to the World Bank, about 30 % of public aid for development concerned the supply of global public 
goods during the nineties. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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Financing can be national. Each state finances the national supply of the global public good 
security. The increase in supply of the public  good security can be  achieved through the 
redistribution of budget allocations, government budget credits, as is the case today in Europe 
and even more so in the United States. But it does not guarantee sufficient production of the 
global public good security as there is the problem of free rider states. Certain states can 
employ the strategy of leaving the task of supplying the public good security to other states, 
either because they have a less serious vision of the risk of terrorism or because they have a 
lower  “capacity  to  pay”  due  to  significant  budget  imbalances  (the  case  of  developing 
countries which constitute the weakest links). In other words, it provides little incentive to 
produce the global public good security insofar as the vision of the risk and the risk itself 
differ from one country to the next. Finally, it does not conform to the objective of equity as 
the  resources  generated  are  proportional  to  the  wealth  of  the  country  (GDP)  whereas 
production of the public good security should be independent from this.  
Financing can be international. The financing modalities can be very diverse: grants, loans at 
single or differentiated rates and conversion of debt into security spending. Each financing 
modality has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
Grants are a source of financing the main advantage of which is that they contribute to the 
objective of equity as they have no effect on the already large debt of developing countries for 
which the effort of upgrading the supply of the global public good security is considerable. 
But they do not guarantee the durability of financing due to the risk of non-reconstitution of 
the donor’s resources
7 and they provide little incentive in the absence of a guarantee of good 
usage  of  the  grants  allocated  to  “security”  projects.  Allocation  does  not,  indeed,  prevent 
fungibility
8  of  the  funds  in  the  presence  of  moral  hazard:  instead  of  contributing  to  an 
                                                            
7 With a risk of substitution of security spending for public aid for development. 
8 The concept of fungibility refers to the possibility that a government may use all or part of the allocated aid to 
ends other than those targeted by the financing.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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additional  national  supply  of  the  global  public  good  security,  the  grants  could  indirectly 
finance other spending.  
Loans are an incentive instrument in a context of differentiation of risks and of incentives. 
The rate of the loan can be modulated according to the efforts already made or to the risks in 
order to encourage the states to make the necessary efforts to supply a sufficient quantity of 
the  global  public  good  security
9.  They  guarantee  the  durability  of  financing  through  the 
reconstruction  of  the  loaning  organisms’  funds.  However,  they  are  inequitable  as  they 
contribute to excessive debt of countries insofar as it is the developing countries, with the 
heaviest debts, which must make the largest relative effort to produce the global public good 
security. In addition, loans are insufficient to guarantee a supply of the public good security 
from the weakest links at the required level as the already high level of debt in numerous 
developing countries limits the borrowing capacity of the states (and also the private sector). 
In this case, financing the supply of the public good security is in direct competition with the 
financing of other state expenditure. 
The conversion of debts, either public or private, into security spending can be envisaged as 
the public and private  creditors are concerned by  this  global public  good. This particular 
financing modality thus contributes to the production of the global public good security but 
also to the production of the global public good “international financial stability” (Wyplosz, 
1999)  by  reducing  the  indebtedness  of  the  countries  most  heavily  in  debt.  This  type  of 
financing provides double the incentive since it slackens the solvency constraint for countries 
which convert their debt and in so doing it contributes to international financial stability. 
Lastly, it is consistent with the idea of equity since the level of financing depends on the level 
of debt, on the condition that the structure of the debt permits the conversion. 
                                                            
9 In the absence of differentiated rates, loans and grants must be suitably combined to favour production of the 
public good security. It means using hybrid financial products linking loans, with or without liberal conditions, 
to a co-financing based on grants. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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The major disadvantage is that it does not necessarily guarantee sufficient financing for the 
supply of the public good security as the latter depends on the level of indebtedness of the 
country
10. 
Financing can be regional. It relies on budgetary contributions from regional organisations 
and on loans from regional development banks. 
Thus public financing, be it national, regional or international, runs the risk of not achieving 
the  desired  supply  of  the  global  public  good  security.  The  question  of  security  should 
consequently  be  considered  as  a  question  of  national  public  goods  requiring  international  
cooperation.  
When financing results from bilateral cooperation, the supply of security risks favouring the 
interests and advantages of partner countries and not cross-border externalities as a whole. In 
particular, it is inequitable as only those countries benefiting from the bilateral cooperation 
have access to the sources of finance. It excludes certain links and thus does not contribute to 
a sufficient global supply of the global public good security. 
These disadvantages may disappear if a leader country initiates and organises the supply of 
security through a “spider’s web” effect i.e. by means of multiple bilateral relationships. In 
this last case, and on the condition that no country escapes the web, all the links will provide a 
sufficient  supply  of  the  global  public  good  security.  There  is  the  risk,  however  that  the 
countries concerned reject bilateral cooperation due to too great a “loss of sovereignty”.  
Financing within the framework of regional cooperation has the same disadvantages as a 
bilateral framework. The regional development banks have the advantage of being closer to 
the needs of the countries.  
                                                            
10 Implementing this type of mechanism is complex. Moreover, the problem of fungibility in the presence of 
moral hazard of expenditure remains from the moment that the budgetary constraint remains strong in numerous 
countries. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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Financing  which  results  from  multilateral  cooperation  has  the  two  main  advantages:  It 
provides all countries with access to sources of financing following the idea of equity; It 
modulates financing according to the needs of each link in such a way as to produce the 
“desired” level of the global public good security. 
d.  Which mechanism(s) should be favoured? 
None  of  the  sources  of  financing  presented  alone  guarantees  a  satisfactory  supply  of  the 
public good security. Certain sources are better adapted to financing the supply of the global 
public good in developed countries, others in developing countries. Some sources are more 
suitable for financing infrastructures and others for training and running costs. 
Table 1 provides a summary of these mechanisms using two fundamental criteria, described 
above, for the supply of security (type of country and type of activity) and two objectives 
(efficiency and equity). 
5.  Financing the production of international trade security : some 
propositions 
It is now a question of highlighting the different financing scenarios. These scenarios are, 
more specifically, constructed around the problematics of financing in developing countries 
where a considerable effort must be made with regard to the supply of the global public good 
security, whereas the developed countries have already invested heavily in the security of the 
international trade since the events of 11
th September 2001. Three main scenarios can be 
envisaged. 
a.  Scenario 1- Local predominance 
The  objectives  of  this  scenario  are,  on  the  one  hand,  to  limit  the  responsibility  of  the 
global/network to defining the “security norm” and, on the other hand, to involve a local CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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control  of  the  financing  and  production  of  the  global  public  good  security  with  the 
participation of private sector both in the financing and supply of the public good security. 
As the level of supply of the global public good security depends on the level of the weakest 
link,  an  “optimum  level”,  in  the  sense  corresponding  to  the  level  “desired”  by  the 
international  community,  must  be  defined  by  the  activities  of  the  global/network  sphere 
(multilateral  institutional  cooperation).  The  financing  for  this  basic  activity  relies  on 
obligatory and voluntary public contributions from the states to multilateral institutions. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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Table 1 - The modalities of financing the supply of the global public good security according to the type of complementary activity 
 
Infrastructure/equipment  Training/operation 
Developed countries 
Payment by users: 
Tax/fee on the value of the goods or on the 
movements of containers 
Private sources: 
Spending on respect of norms, certification, 
security agreement 
Financial arrangements by commercial banks and 
equipment manufacturers 
National public sources: 
Governmental budget credits 
Payment by users: 
Port fees modulated according to a security 
agreement 
Tax/fee on the value of the goods or on the 
movements of containers 
“Additional tax” on containers controlled 
Middle-income developing 
countries with  
Payment by users: 
Tax/fee on the value of the goods or on the 
movements of containers 
Private sources: 
Spending on respect of norms, certification, 
security agreement 
Financial arrangements by commercial banks and 
equipment manufacturers 
Foundations 
National public sources: 
Governmental budget credits 
Multilateral public sources: 
Loans at differentiated rates 
Debt conversion  
Payment by users: 
Port fees modulated according to a security 
agreement 
Fees collected by the port authorities or 
security companies 
Tax/fee on the value of the goods or on the 
movements of containers 




Payment by users: 
Tax/fee on the value of the goods or on the 
movements of containers 
Private sources: 
Foundations 
Multilateral public sources: 
Grants 
Debt conversion 
Payment by users: 
Fees collected by the port authorities or 
security companies 
Tax/fee on the value of the goods or on the 
movements of containers 
“Additional tax” on containers controlled 
Multilateral public sources: 
Grants CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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Once this level of supply has been defined, the financing and production of the global public 
good security can be left to the initiative of each state in partnership with the private sector. In 
this context, each state controls the finance mechanisms. The different mechanisms in table 1 
can be used according to local specificities. 
The risk of this scenario is insufficient local production of the global public good security by 
the weakest links, essentially due to free rider behaviours and the problem of fungibility of 
funds in the presence of moral hazard. 
a.  Scenario 2 – Extended cooperation 
The  objectives  of  this  scenario  are,  on  the  one  hand,  to  extend  the  responsibility  of  the 
network sphere to defining the financing mechanisms likely to guarantee the “desired” level 
of  supply  of  the  global  public  good  security  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  involve  a  local 
management of the financing and supply of the global public good security. 
Payment by users appears here as probably the most efficient financing mechanism in terms 
of collecting funds. Moreover, its management is relatively simple at the local level. The 
mechanism chosen should conform to the international commitments of the countries with the 
WTO. For this reason, a specific fee per container would surely be preferred to an ad valorem 
tax. Indeed, an ad valorem tax on trade could be compared to an additional tariff inconsistent 
with the measures of the GATT. 
This scenario assumes that for spending on equipment and infrastructure, an international fee 
is created where the level and modalities of application are defined by the activities of the 
network sphere and the collection and use are the responsibility of each state (local sphere). 
This fee should be applied to each container and to the volume for loose goods. For spending 
on training and operations, the initiative of financing mechanisms is taken at the level of the 
states in collaboration with the private sector (local sphere). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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The international fee allows simple and considerable levying of funds in view of the spending 
on equipment and infrastructure necessary in the security of the international trade. As annual 
container traffic represents about 280 million units, a specific fee of 1 dollar per container 
would provide 280 million dollars per year, which represents only about 0.005 % of the fob 
value of the goods
11.  
Moreover, due to its simple administration and the amount levied, this fee could also be used 
to finance running and training costs in the developing countries. 
This international fee does not prevent the other sources of financing from being collected at 
local level, especially for developing countries which only compete for about 30% of world 
trade and which only collect resources corresponding to this participation although they have 
to make a considerable effort to achieve a sufficient level of supply of the global public good 
security.  
This scenario thus allows considerable funds to be collected on a worldwide scale, but in no 
way guarantees that the supply of the global public good security, notably by the weakest 
links, will be sufficient due, on the one hand, to the asymmetry of global trade flows which 
limit the financing possible in developing countries and, on the other hand, to the fungibility 
of public funds in these countries.  
b.  Scenario 3 – International funds and equity 
The objective of this scenario is that the responsibility of the network sphere be extended to 
the international administration and management of the financing mechanism with a view to 
guaranteeing sufficient and durable local supply of the global public good security for all the 
links and, more particularly, for the weakest links. This scenario, which is essentially based 
on the idea of equity, involves a dual-level financing mechanism. 
                                                            
11 World exports amounted to 6,112 billion dollars in 2001 (UNCTAD web site). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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The first level aims at the durable collection of resources to guarantee the desired level of 
supply at an international level. The favoured instrument is an international fund supplied by 
an international fee on containers and by voluntary contributions of the states and the private 
sector. 
The second level aims at the equitable and incentive-providing redistribution of the resources 
of  the  fund  with  a  view  to  sufficient  local  supply  of  the  global  public  good  security, 
considering  the  level  “desired”  by  the  international  community.  It  therefore  concerns  the 
administration and management of the fund. 
This  second  level  is  the  keystone  of  scenario  3.  The  objective  of  the  administration  and 
management of this fund by the network sphere is to make the necessary resources available 
to all the links for the local supply of the global public good security whilst guaranteeing the 
effective allocations for the projects of security of the international trade. According to the 
types of country and activity, different mechanisms allow the resources of the fund to be 
allocated to financing the local supply of the global public good security. 
For spending on equipment and infrastructure, loans at differentiated rates are to be favoured 
for developed countries and middle-income developing countries. They allow resources to be 
made available whose cost can be modulated either according to the risk or according to the 
efforts already made in terms of security. For the middle-income developing countries, the 
availability of resources can also take the form of relief on loans obtained from traditional 
bilateral,  regional  or  multilateral  sponsors.  Grants  should  be  favoured  for  low-income 
developing countries due to the limited borrowing capacity of most of these countries and 
their lower level of supply of the global public good security. 
With regard to spending on training and running costs, the financing mechanisms should be 
left, for developed countries and middle-income developing countries, to the initiative of the 
states  in  collaboration  with  the  private  sector  (local  sphere).  For  low-income  developing CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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countries, this spending can be financed on the basis of local mechanisms as for the other 
countries. However, spending on training which accompanies spending  on equipment and 
infrastructure should be financed by the international fund by means of grants due to the low 
contributive capacity of these countries. 
The revenue from the international fee is collected by the public authorities of each country 
(customs administration) and is transferred to the international fund. A variant of scenario 3 
can consist in leaving part of the revenues from the fee in the country that collected it in order 
to  establish  a  certain  flexibility  in  financing  the  local  supply  of  the  global  public  good 
security. This part should necessarily be limited in order to  guarantee both equitable and 
efficient financing allowing the “desired level” of supply of the global public good security to 
be reached. 
Table  2  presents  the  three  scenarios.  The  shaded  area  indicates  the  responsibility  of  the 
network sphere in financing the supply of the global public good security. 
The decisive point which structures this entire scenario resides in the necessity to reinforce 
the capacities of the international institutions by creating an International Fund. The expected 
gains in this scenario i.e. by the intermediary financing of the international institutions in 
financing the complementary activities, logically refers to the objectives of efficiency and 
equity of financing. 
The  intermediation  of  the  international  institutions  in  financing  security  should  first  and 
foremost  allow  the  problems  of  moral  hazard  to  be  limited  i.e.  poor  use  of  funds  and 
opportunist behaviour of the players. Indeed, to ensure the financial participation of all the 
states,  as  well  as  companies,  organisations  of  the  society  and  people,  two  elements 
are necessary: efficient incentives for entry and a credible system of surveillance to verify that 
each  player  fulfils  his  part  of  the  contract.  It  is  here  a  question  of  benefiting  from  the 
“information producer” dimension of the international institutions causing it, thanks to its CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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central position between the different players in the international trade, to be the vector of 
harmonisation of local (national) security norms, to filter requests for financing – in relation 
to the security norm(s) – from agents requesting funds and thus to minimise the costs of 
researching and verifying the information necessary for financing. This activity of producing 
information will, moreover, make the necessary control of the use of funds easier and less 
costly
12. The repetition and continuity of the relationship between these institutions and the 
players  likely  to  benefit  from  financing  should  furthermore  facilitate  the  detection  of 
opportunist  behaviours  (continuity  of  the  relationship)  and  dissuade  these  players  from 
practising this type of behaviour (the renewal of financing is subject to the respect of the 
rules). 
The  creation  of  an  International  Fund  also  has  the  decisive  advantage  of  bypassing  the 
problem of free riders as the Fund is mainly supplied by a fee (even if voluntary contributions 
should be encouraged). 
The  intermediation  of  the  international  institutions  in  financing  security  also  has  the 
advantage of eliminating all risk of under-supply of the global public good security. We know 
that this risk exists in the absence of coordinated financing decisions of the different players 
(this is the problem of the “prisoner’s dilemma” mentioned earlier). Indeed, in the absence of 
perfect (and thus shared) knowledge of the strategies of the players, the different players 
adopt at best a “lemming” behaviour which leads them to take individual decisions regarding 
production of the public good, the aggregated level of which is lower to the global level of 
production  which  would  have  been  achieved  in  a  context  of  active  cooperation.  The 
international institutions, an informed and informative (i.e. which informs) coordinating body, 
is ideally positioned to serve as a vector of coordination between the players involved in 
security. 
                                                            
12 The cost would in any case be lower than in the case of bilateral control. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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Table 2 – The financing scenarios of the supply of the global public good security 
    Complementary activities  
   
Basic activity 




Obligatory and voluntary public 
contributions from the states to the 
multilateral institutions  
Governmental budget credits 
Private financing 
Bilateral and multilateral public loans 
Local fees   
 
 
Scenario 1  Low-income developing 
countries 
Obligatory public contributions from the 
states to the multilateral institutions 
Bilateral and multilateral public grants  Local fees 




Obligatory and voluntary public 
contributions from the states to the 
multilateral institutions 
International fee on the movements of 
containers, managed locally 






Obligatory public contributions from the 
states to the multilateral institutions 
 
 
International fee on the movements of 
containers, managed locally 
Local fees 




Obligatory and voluntary public 
contributions from the states to the 
multilateral institutions 
1
st level: international fund supplied 
by an international fee on the 
movements of containers 
2
nd level: loans obtained from the fund 
Local fees 
(or part of the international fee) 
Local fees 







Obligatory public contributions from the 
states to the multilateral institutions 
1
st level: international fund supplied 
by an international fee on the 
movements of containers 
2
nd level: grants obtained from the 
fund  Grants obtained from the fund for 
training activities 
 
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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Finally, the intermediation of the international institutions in financing security represents a 
guarantee when confronted with the problem of distortion of competition. As the measures 
and opinions formulated by these institutions are by nature based on the supra-national and 
multilateral  framework,  it  is  the  general  interest  in  its  entirety  which  is  the  structuring 
objective of these institutions. 
It is important at this stage to underline the fact that if scenario 3 pursues an objective of 
efficiency,  it  is  not  to  the  detriment  of  equity.  On  the  contrary,  the  intervention  of  the 
International Fund in the financing of training and operating expenditure for low-income 
countries  reflects  a  desire  to  follow  the  two  key  objectives  of  financing  together.  The 
distinction  between  loans  to  finance  infrastructure  spending  in  countries  with  a  high 
contributive capacity and grants to finance this same type of spending in countries with a low 
contributive capacity is the second illustration of this desire. A third illustration is the accent 
placed on the voluntary contributions of developed countries to finance the basic activities, 
and a fourth is the fact that the funds are mainly supplied by an international fee for the 
movements of goods (idea of redistribution). 
It would be in this idea of equity, which is certainly desirable, that the fund could serve to 
finance the upgrading programmes in the field of security by modulating the modalities and 
levels of finance  according to the contributive capacities of the players/countries (idea of 
equity) as well as the efforts deployed by these same players to commit themselves to a real 
idea of security (idea of incentive). 
Overall, the creation of an International Fund acting as a support for scenario 3 and managed 
by  the  international  institutions  fulfils  the  majority  of  the  characteristics  of  the  “ideal” 
mechanism for financing a public good (Sagasti, Bezanson, 2001) that is: sufficient collection 
of funds, the durability of financing, equity of financing based on contributive capacities,  
flexibility and a capacity to adapt the modes of financing which require the permanence of the CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.13 
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institutions which implement them, and administrative simplicity inversely proportional to the 
number of intermediaries in the financing.  
Of  course,  more  than  any  other  thing,  the  necessary  condition  for  this  scenario  to  be 
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